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Figure 1: FIMETIS is a tool providing an interactive exploration of file system snapshots. Analysts can quickly investigate
cybersecurity incidents via three complementary views: A – list view with file system records, B – histogram with a timeline, and
C – data clusters.
Abstract
Investigating cybersecurity incidents requires in-depth knowledge
from the analyst. Moreover, the whole process is demanding due
to the vast data volumes that need to be analyzed. While various
techniques exist nowadays to help with particular tasks of the anal-
ysis, the process as a whole still requires a lot of manual activities
and expert skills. We propose an approach that allows the analy-
sis of disk snapshots more efficiently and with lower demands on
expert knowledge. Following a user-centered design methodology,
we implemented an analytical tool to guide analysts during security
incident investigations. The viability of the solution was validated by
an evaluation conducted with members of different security teams.
Keywords: incident investigation, digital evidence, file system
metadata, data analysis
Index Terms: Human-centered computing—Visual analytics; Se-
curity and privacy—Systems security—File system security; Ap-
plied computing—Computer forensics—Evidence collection, stor-
age and analysis;
*e-mail: beran@ics.muni.cz
†e-mail: hrdina@ics.muni.cz
‡e-mail: kouril@ics.muni.cz
§e-mail: oslejsek@fi.muni.cz
¶e-mail: zakopcanova@mail.muni.cz
©2020 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new
collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
1 Introduction
Cybercrime has rapidly developed over the past years [10], and
cybersecurity threats are expected to present significant risks for the
future [1]. For computer systems to be able to face the constantly
changing threat landscape, it is necessary to develop and maintain
capabilities for responding to cybersecurity attacks. A vital part of
the response process consists of the investigation of the evidence,
which reveals the nature of the incident and performed activities.
The investigation depends heavily on a proper evaluation of all
collected evidence. Methods of digital forensics [8,17] are employed
for systematic scrutiny of the data. It is a continuous process where
hypotheses are formulated based on observations followed by steps
to either confirm or deny the theory.
A simplified scheme of an investigation workflow is depicted in
Figure 2. First, the suspicion of an incident is reported in the form
of a preliminary report. Then, data sources for digital evidence of
the incident are collected. They capture either the broader state of
involved computer networks and communication history (net flows,
PCAPs) or the state of involved devices (system logs, the content of
disks, memory snapshots, etc.).
The iterative investigation is often time-consuming and requires
a high level of expert knowledge. The amount of data collected is
often high, which only complicates the analysis. While the forensic
investigation methods provide a great platform to derive particular
results, a user-oriented approach is missing to simplify the overall
process.
Permanent storage devices are a crucial part of contemporary
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Figure 2: Incident investigation process. The FIMETIS tool deals with file system metadata only.
computer systems and data retrieved from these devices provide sig-
nificant input for the investigation. The state of permanent storage
can be captured in multiple ways. The most straightforward and
complete approach is to analyze the complete disk content. How-
ever, as current media tend to be quite large—it is not uncommon
for disks to provide several terabytes of capacity—the analysis be-
comes time- and resource-demanding. Moreover, analyzing disk
content encounters privacy issues when the data contain sensitive
information [9].
One way of coping with the volume and privacy problems is to
work only with file metadata, extracted from permanent storage,
which include the file owner, size, name and dates of last manipula-
tions. However, even though such a dataset is much smaller in size
compared to raw disk images, it is still necessary to process hun-
dreds of thousands of records already in case of a standard storage.
Moreover, it requires deep knowledge about the relationships among
files, their purpose in the system, and importance for the attacker.
In this paper, we propose visual-analytic methods that make the
investigation of file system metadata significantly more efficient
and are also available to analysts with no deep domain knowledge.
We describe an application called FIMETIS (FIlesystem METadata
analysIS) that was developed to verify the visual-analytic concepts.
Evaluation of this tool has shown that the user interface is easy to
learn and well supports analytical tasks. Even less skilled partic-
ipants were able to investigate and reconstruct a real incident in
limited time at surprising precision and level of details.
2 Related Work
Many tools and approaches dealing with individual types of data
sources for digital evidence can be found.
So far, big attention has been paid to the investigation of network
communication. NetCapVis [27] provides a post-incident visual
analysis of PCAP files that capture network traffic. TVi [3] is a
tool that combines multiple visual representations of network traces
to support different levels of visual-based querying and reasoning
required for making sense of complex traffic data. Visualization
techniques proposed by Gray et al. [11] provide conceptual network
navigation for situational awareness in network communication.
Analysis of system logs was researched as part of ELVIS [14]
and CORGI [15], for instance. These tools, both proposed by the
same authors, provide security-oriented log visualizations that allow
security experts to visually explore and link numerous types of log
files through relevant representations and global filtering. A top-
down approach to the log exploration is provided by the Visual
Filter [26] tool, which represents the whole log in a single overview
and then allows the investigators to navigate and make context-
preserving sub-selections.
Disks and permanent storage provide another valuable source
of information for the digital investigation. Disk and file systems
analysis can be performed in several layers [7]. Approaches ad-
dressing specific features are, for example, Change-link 2.0 [18],
which provides several visualizations to capture changes to files and
directories over time, or the work of Heitzmann et al. [13], who
proposed a visual representation of access control permissions in a
standard hierarchical file system using treemaps.
This paper deals with the utilization of file system metadata as
they have lesser demands on volumes and do not threaten data
sensitivity. The utility of metadata for digital forensics has been ar-
ticulated previously [4], and various techniques for metadata-based
analyses have been proposed since then. The use of metadata to pro-
vide a fingerprint of actions performed with files has been suggested
to streamline file system analysis [16].
Metadata attributes are also known to be useful to reconstruct a
timeline of previous activities [12] and have been demonstrated to
locate suspicious files [21]. These techniques address the particular
sub-problems of the analysis. To facilitate the whole investigation
process, it is necessary to support interactive work, which would
support the above-mentioned analytical techniques and make them
easily accessible to users.
Only a few papers can be found on approaches supporting in-
teractive work with the data of digital evidence, which is essential
for the whole forensic investigation process. Our literature survey
revealed two works dealing with timelines constructed from file
system activities, which are very relevant to our research.
The Zeitline [5] tool represents activities as generic events. The
user interface enables analysts to group events and then make the
timeline hierarchical, to filter obtained data trees, and locate specific
events by queries.
In the CyberForensic TimeLab [19], the timeline is implemented
as a histogram using bars to represent the number of pieces of evi-
dence at a specific time. The investigator can highlight interesting
parts of the timeline and zoom in to get greater detail of that particu-
lar time span.
Both the tools are designed as generic, enabling analysts to create
timelines from multiple resources, e.g., from file system metadata as
well as system logs, and their user interfaces reflect this universality.
In contrast, our approach focuses solely on file snapshots build from
metadata only. We aim to make the analysis of this specific data
maximally effective, focusing not only on the timeline but also on
other data available for files. To reach this goal, we follow a user-
centered design methodology, which is extended with a mechanism
guiding the investigator during the process. Although our design
shares some visual elements with the CyberForensic TimeLab, e.g.,
histograms, our solution provides an interface fine-tuned for a single
specific use case – a forensic analysis of file system snapshots. On
the other hand, the visual-analytics concepts proposed in this paper
are sufficiently general that they could be extended to other types of
timeline in the future.
3 Design Methodology
In this project, we applied the user-centered approach guided by
the design study methodology framework [25], mainly reflecting its
core stages: discover, design, implement, deploy.
In the discover stage, we gained a better understanding of the
workflows of the digital investigation and elicited user requirements
on the tool in order to simplify the analytical tasks.
The initial insight into the application domain was provided by a
co-author of this paper, who is a member of the cybersecurity team
of Masaryk University. Based on his initial input, we conducted
semi-structured informal interviews with two other domain experts
who have long-term experience with practical investigations of cy-
bersecurity incidents. The first respondent works as a senior security
specialist at CESNET – an academic institution in the Czech Repub-
lic providing IT services to Czech academia. The second expert is a
member of the incident response team at Masaryk University. All
three of them have long-term experience with practical investigation
of cybersecurity incidents. Each interview lasted about two hours.
Based on these interviews, we distilled a generic workflow of the
investigation process and formulated requirements for a file system
analysis. The results are presented in Section 4.
In the design stage, we proposed the visual elements and the
interactive dashboard reflecting the functional requirements. The
design was proposed and refined iteratively. User interfaces were
continuously prototyped under consultation with the domain expert
(co-author of the paper). Proposed visual encoding is described in
Section 5.
In the implement stage, we iteratively developed the analytical
dashboard. We paid attention to the observation that cybersecurity
experts investigate incidents rarely, and evidence collection is a long-
term interactive process. Architecture and implementation of the
tool are described in Section 6.
In the deploy stage, we evaluated the tool. As the investigation
of real cybersecurity incidents is a sensitive process, we could not
perform a usability study in the wild. Moreover, as the developed
tool deals with only part of this process, we conducted a qualitative
evaluation focused directly on the tool. However, we used data from
a real incident. The evaluation is described in Section 7 and results
are summarized in Section 8.
4 Requirement Analysis
The interviews conducted during the discover stage of the design
methodology revealed that incident investigators would benefit from
an interactive tool for file system exploration. Specific requirements
were inferred from the characteristics of the data and the analytical
workflow.
4.1 Data Characteristics and Abstraction
The investigation of cybersecurity incidents aims to provide answers
to key questions related to the incident, like when the activities
happened, what data was changed during the incident, where the
activities originated from, etc. The process of investigation is driven
by methodologies stipulated by digital forensics. The whole process
comprises three main stages during which the evidence is acquired,
analyzed, and the final report is produced. A simplified schema of
the process is depicted in Figure 2.
During the acquisition phase, the investigator needs to identify
and collect the data that is likely to provide evidence about the case.
The number of possible data sources from which digital evidence
can be collected is vast. In case of forensic examinations performed
directly on the machine, it is common to gather data from permanent
storage (hard disk or external device like USB storage). There are
also other sources of digital evidence, such as network traffic or its
metadata, state and content of volatile memory, or information about
authentication attempts. The rest of the paper deals with analysis of
files and their metadata. It keeps the investigation domain limited in
size while making it possible to evaluate the main principles.
File metadata describes information about the file, maintained by
the operating system together with the file data. The exact scope of
metadata depends on the operating system used, however, nowadays,
it is common for all widely used file systems to recognize the file
name, file ownership (specifying the user and a group), content size,
and access rights. Besides these, several timestamps are maintained,
indicating the time when key activities with the file or the metadata
were last performed:
• a-time: the time when the file content was last read (accessed),
• m-time: the time when the file content was last modified,
• c-time: the time when the metadata record was last changed
(e.g., during the change of access rights),
• b-time: the time when the file was created. The b-time times-
tamp is supported only by advanced file systems.
All the timestamps, except for b-time, change during the file
life-time based on the operations performed. When a timestamp is
updated, the previous value is overwritten and lost, which means
they always refer only to the last performed actions.
Timestamps are an essential source of information for the re-
construction of events relevant to the investigation. They can help
understand when certain operations took place but also reveal the
nature of the activities performed. For instance, when a file is copied
from another computer, the copying process usually retains the orig-
inal timestamp. Such a file has the m-time value set to a date before
the b-time and c-time values, which both will refer to the time when
the copying process finished. A brand-new file created on the system
has all the timestamps set to the same value upon creation. The
difference in the timestamps can reveal where the file originates
from.
Even if they do not reveal the actual file content, all file metadata
attributes play a big role in the incident analysis. One of the most
important reconstructions is determination of the timeline of actions
performed in the analyzed system. A timeline emphasizes crucial
activities conducted during the incident. For instance, it specifies
when the attacker accessed the system for the first time or when a
specific system configuration got changed.
A timeline constructed from metadata is a list of records ordered
by the timestamps. Since there are multiple timestamp types as-
signed to a file, a single file can occur multiple times in the list,
whenever its timestamps differ. A typical timeline contains hundreds
of thousands of records, which need to be further analyzed.
In addition to providing input to recover the timeline, metadata
can be used for efficient filtering of files, based on unique fingerprints
they form, such as similarities of file locations, common access
rights, or suspicious ownership.
4.2 Requirements
Based on the interviews, data abstraction, and the analytical work-
flow, we identified five functional requirements:
R1: Exploration of the file system structure. During the in-
vestigation, the analysts have to pay attention to different parts of
the file system, e.g., files in a specific directory, files with specific
extensions, or all log files. However, the interviewed domain experts
emphasized that the interactive hierarchical exploration of the file
system is not helpful. Instead, they need a global temporal view of
the file system data with the possibility to navigate in the file system
structure effectively. The analytical tool should support analysts
in the efficient switching between different parts of the file system
and narrowing the area of interest by offering filtering functions that
would localize the data by various aspects and meaning encoded in
the available file system metadata.
R2: Exploration of temporal relationships. Disk snapshots
have strong temporal characteristics. Each record provides the times-
tamp of the last manipulation, e.g., the creation, modification, or
access. However, every file or directory usually appears multiple
times in the dataset as the manipulation timestamps differ, which
increases the data volume to be inspected. Also, the recorded data
period is often very long, containing timestamps from a time long
before the system was installed (but from when the files were cre-
ated). Therefore, providing a scalable temporal view on the data
with efficient filtering, zooming, and preserving time coherence is
very important for making the analysis effective.
R3: Detection of file system anomalies. Some combinations
of file locations and attributes can be considered unusual or de-
serving analyst’s attention. For example, publicly writable files or
directories, hidden files outside of users’ homes, executables with
administrator’s privileges, files masking their names (e.g., a binary
file with a .txt extension or named with only white spaces). The
analytical tool should provide multiple views on various combina-
tions of location paths and attributes in order to localize potential
anomalies easily, and then further explore the corresponding files
using R1 and R2 principles.
R4: Traces of the execution of suspicious commands. Some
commands are seldom used by administrators but often used by
attackers. For example, the shred Unix command is often used to
wipe data content. The tool should allow analysts to verify whether
or not such commands were used. Command execution can be
identified by the a-time attribute. Once the command execution
is confirmed, the analyst can use interactions reflecting R1 and
R2 to explore details, analyze the impact of the execution, and
either confirm or reject the hypothesis that an attacker executed the
command.
R5: Traces of batch processing. Besides the execution of spe-
cific commands (R4), attackers often use scripts to perform recon-
naissance on the system or to compile programs or libraries before
installing them into the system. These batch activities can be rec-
ognized by the execution of multiple commands or the creation of
multiple files in a short time, while manual tasks take a longer time.
However, batch processing can represent a legal activity, e.g., the
legal compilation or the result of regular system updates. There-
fore, the tool should support analysts in efficiently identifying batch
processes in the huge amount of file system data and then allowing
them to analyze suspicious activities further using R1 and R2.
While the requirements R1 and R2 reflect the generic investi-
gation workflow, requirements R3–R5 are related to more specific
analytical questions that are often asked during the file system in-
vestigation. Besides these functional requirements, we set two com-
plementary qualitative requirements that affect the architecture and
implementation. These requirements follow the practice emphasized
by the interviewees where cybersecurity experts investigate incidents
rarely, and every investigation takes a lot of time (hours or days).
R6: Easy to use. Even practicing incident investigators analyze
disks rarely (see Section 7). Therefore, they should be able to use the
tool even after a long period without the need for repeated learning.
R7: Persistence. The data and interactions have to be persistent
so that an analyst can pause the investigation process and continue
later on. Persistence is also important for recalling previous investi-
gations and comparing hypotheses and results.
5 Visual Design
In this section, we summarize the design rationale, visual encoding,
and interaction capabilities. The user interface consists of three
coordinated views [20,24], where a change in one view to the dataset
affects other parts of the dashboard.
5.1 List View
The List View (Figure 1 – A) is a dominant part of the dashboard
providing a view on the raw data. Records are sorted by the times-
tamp by default (R2), but they can be re-ordered according to the file
system structure (R1) by clicking on the File Name or Type columns.
Individual columns can be shown or hidden via the List View menu
(the three dots in the up-right corner of the list view area).
Figure 3: Detail of smart block skipping in the List View.
Analysts can browse records traditionally by scrolling the list
up and down, or they can use smart block skipping (Figure 3) that
significantly increases the efficiency of the list exploration. By
clicking on a timestamp or a file path, the prefix is highlighted, and
a context menu appears that enables analysts to skip records with
the same prefix. Using this feature, analysts can quickly navigate to
the next or previous date, hour, or sub-directory, and then accelerate
the data exploration either from structural (R1) or temporal (R2)
perspective.
The background of lines with the same timestamp is brushed to
visually distinguish different time blocks (R2).
Search operation in the list works at two levels (the name selection
label in Figure 4). Typing text into the input search field highlights
the corresponding parts of the file paths. If the text is confirmed or
the user clicks at the magnifier icon, then the list of records is filtered
out, and only relevant lines remain displayed, enabling the analyst
to pay attention to only desired files and directories (R1,R4). Data
filtered out in this way remains in the Histogram (see subsection 5.2)
to preserve a broader context, but they are grayed out.
Records of high importance can be bookmarked (the bookmarks
label in Figure 4). Bookmarked records are emphasized in the list,
displayed in the Histogram view, and used for fast navigation (R2).
Bookmarks are persistent throughout the whole analysis and can
be removed only on demand. Moreover, as they provide a broader
context with significant events, the bookmarked lines are always
visible in the List View, even if they do not fit all filters of the
dashboard at the moment.
5.2 Histogram
The Histogram section (Figure 1 – B) provides an interactive view
on data distribution.
The y-axis encodes the number of records. The axis has a loga-
rithmic scale to deal with high peaks that often appear in the data
but still preserve the visibility of low numbers that can be important
for analysts.
Figure 4: Navigation and filtering in the List View and Histogram.
The x-axis is scaled automatically (the auto-scale label in Fig-
ure 4). When zooming in, the x-axis automatically changes from
years to months, days, and hours, and vice versa. The bars are recal-
culated and aggregated accordingly, representing the distribution in
a specific year, month, day, etc. Zooming can be performed either
by mouse, keyboard, or via icons in the upper-right corner.
Different colors in the histogram encode different file system
operations (values of the Type column in the List View). Color
encoding is shown in the Timestamp selection section. A detailed
description of the metadata attributes is provided when the mouse is
located over an icon. Similarly, hovering the mouse pointer above
a bar in the histogram triggers a pop-up tool-tip with attribute type,
time, and an exact number of records. Clicking on a bar scrolls the
List View to the corresponding entries.
The Timestamp selection is also used for per-attribute filtering
(the attribute selection label in Figure 4). Attributes can be switched
on or off in the histogram by clicking on the icons. The List View is
updated accordingly – only the records with selected attributes are
shown in the list.
The histogram also serves as a time focusing tool (the time se-
lection label in Figure 4). Using a mouse, the analyst can draw
multiple span windows and thus restrict the lines shown in the List
View. A context menu appears when a user selects a selection span
window. This menu enables the user to perform common operations,
like extending the span, zooming into the span, or erasing the span.
Some of these operations are available via direct mouse interaction
in the histogram as well.
Due to restricted space on the web page, the List View displays
only part of all the records at any one time (the rest is available via
scrolling). Visible records represent span, which is emphasized in
the x-axis of the histogram as a cyan stripe (the visible time span
label in Figure 4). This stripe supports the visual correlation between
the List View and the histogram.
Entries bookmarked in the List View are shown in the histogram
as push-pin icons. If they are too dense, they are aggregated into
a single icon with a number of merged bookmarks. Details are
provided as a tool-tip triggered on the mouse hover. Click on the
icon scrolls the List View into the corresponding entry (to the first
record in the case of aggregated push-pin). Push-pins that are out of
selection spans are not clickable.
Span selectors, bookmarks, and automatically adaptable x-axis
represent a powerful combination enabling analysts to scale and
explore data from the time perspective (R2).
The structural exploration (R1) is less dominant in the histogram
view. It is mainly restricted to the per-attribute filtering of records.
On the other hand, the per-attribute filtering combined with the
path filtering of the List View provides a generic approach to solve
R3 and R5. For example, a C/C++ compilation process accesses
header files and the gcc compiler binary. A proper combination
of the filters can reveal these traces. Moreover, the compilation
unusually touches a huge amount of header files, leaving peaks in
the histogram, especially when performed in calm nighttime.
5.3 Clusters
Clusters (Figure 1 – C) represent a generic mechanism enabling
analysts to select files or directories with a specific ”fingerprint”.
Clusters are defined by the combination of modification attributes
(entries with m-a-c-b modification types) and regular expressions
applied to the file names. Taking into account analytical require-
ments R3 – R5 and needs of domain experts, we predefined several
clusters covering the most common investigation tasks for UNIX
file systems. Additional clusters can be easily appended.
• All files –The default cluster with no filtering.
• User SSH files – Configuration files and SSH keys stored in
the users’ home directories.
• Standard executables – Files stored in the standard system
directories for binaries, e.g., /bin, /sbin.
• Python/shell/PHP/perl scripts – Several clusters based on stan-
dard file extensions, e.g. .py, .sh.
• Cron definitions – Files stored in the default locations of cron
jobs, i.e., regularly executed services.
• Starts with ’.’ – Hidden files or directories.
• Suspicious files – Files or directories with names consisting of
dots and white spaces.
• Executables with sbit – Executables that can run under a differ-
ent user or group privileges than the original user or group.
• Weak permissions – Executable files writable for general users.
• Compilation signs – Access to C/C++ header files and the
compiler executables.
• Unusual commands – Commands that are rarely used by com-
mon system administration, but often by attackers, e.g., wget,
curl, and shred.
• System configuration changes – Important files related to the
system configuration, e.g., /etc/init.d or /etc/passwd.
In the current implementation, only one cluster can be selected
at one time. The number of all records fulfilling cluster criteria is
shown as a “total entries” number. The “filtered entries” indicator
shows the number of records satisfying other filtering criteria of the
dashboard, and then they are listed in the List view and included in
the histogram. A bar under each cluster box visually emphasizes the
ratio between the filtered and total records, enabling the analysts to
identify the impact of currently used filtering criteria on clusters.
6 System Architecture and Implementation
FIMETIS is designed as a client-server application. The client part
is implemented as a web application built on the Angular framework.
Interactive visualizations use the D3.js library. The server part
provides services for file system data management (import, export)
and interactive data processing via the client. The Flask REST API
handles the client-server communication. Flask is a lightweight
web server gateway interface written in Python, which mediates
access to the backend API – the center of the application logic
and communication with databases. This architecture enables a
concurrent investigation of multiple sources. It is possible to open
two file systems simultaneously in two different explorer windows,
for instance, and explore them side by side.
Persistence (R7) is guaranteed by two database systems. The file
system snapshots are stored in the NoSQL Elasticsearch database.
Configuration data, user accounts, interactions (e.g., bookmarks),
and other operational data related to the analysis are stored in the
rational Postgresql database.
7 Evaluation
To gather feedback on how well the tool fulfill the requirements R1–
R5, and to identify possible refinements for the future design process
iteration, we conducted a qualitative evaluation. The evaluation was
held in June 2020.
7.1 Participants
We conducted the user study with five cybersecurity professionals
who represent the target audience of the tool. All of them are
members of the university cybersecurity research team or a security
team in another organization. One participant works as an incident
investigator in a private company. The average age of all participants
was 30.2 years (SD=3.5); all of them were males. Two of them
participated in initial interviews from which the requirements were
derived. However, they did not participate on the design of the tool.
All the participants were cybersecurity professionals. However,
they differ in the experience with practical investigation of incidents
using file system analysis. Their skills are summarized in Table 1.
ID Age Occupation INC
P1 34 researcher in cybersecurity <3
P2 32 researcher in cybersecurity 0
P3 32 incident investigator – network analyst <3
P4 26 lead security analyst >10
P5 27 incident investigator >10
Table 1: Demographic information of our participants. Occupation –
position related to network administration and incident investigation,
INC – number of incidents investigated by the analyst using disk
analysis.
7.2 Data sets
During the evaluation, we used two datasets that were captured from
computers affected by real incidents. The files were maintained us-
ing the ext4 file system, which is commonly used on UNIX servers.
We used different mechanisms to capture the primary data, yielding
some records without the b-time timestamp (see 4.1). The first
dataset contained 308311 records and was used for the tool demon-
stration and familiarization of participants with the dashboard. The
second dataset consisted of 505742 records and was used for the
evaluation.
We carefully analyzed the second dataset using FIMETIS to
reconstruct the incident to establish a baseline for the evaluation.
Navigating through the predefined clusters, we gradually collected
a list of crucial findings relevant to the incident. We identified six
clusters that are most relevant to providing evidence of the incident.
• User SSH files – Displays access to SSH key files used by the
attacker to control remote access to user’s account.
• Suspicious files – A bunch of files is visible in /var/tmp/....
The directory name is suspicious (... is often seen during
attacks) and it contained files named using IP addresses, sug-
gesting it was used as a cache for network scans.
• Executables with sbit – In addition to standard Unix commands,
the output reveals file /var/lib/.s, which is definitely not
legit (tries to hide itself and elevates the executable rights using
the root s-bit parameter).
• Unusual commands – Two HTTP command-line clients can
be seen in the output that are used recently: wget and curl.
• System configuration changes – Changes to the machine user
accounts can be identified in the output.
• Compilation signs – Several compilations of C-language codes
are present in the dataset.
However, these pieces of evidence are often hidden in a huge
amount of other entries. Therefore, using the list view and histogram
is necessary to focus attention on relevant parts of the dataset. Hav-
ing put all the collected information together, we compiled a precise
summary of the incident and its timeline:
S1: 2016-05-25, 00:40: The attacker illegally logged in the account
of user martin using SSH for remote access. Further analy-
sis showed that the attacker abused unsecured NFS access to
/home directory, allowing to upload of files and execution of
privileged binaries. This is the only part of the analysis that
could not be done just with the file system metadata, but the
provided file system evidence gave a precise lead about what
to check in the system logs and configuration.
S2: 2016-05-25, 02:40: The attacker installed a trojan code. A
purportedly malicious libselinux library was downloaded
using the wget command, and the system configuration (in
file /etc/ld.so.preload) was changed to likely inject the
library into every newly created process. The SSH service was
restarted to activate the trojan code (either a backdoor and/or
credential-stealing). A suspicious s-bit file /var/lib/.s was
installed simultaneously, probably to trigger the illicit activi-
ties.
S3: 2016-05-25, 19:20: There are suspicious activities in the ac-
count of user roberto. This account was probably also com-
promised a few hours later by the attacker as both the accounts
show similar signs, e.g., an empty file named 1. The reason is
uncertain. However, there is no evidence that this account was
used for suspicious activities.
S4: 2016-05-25, 21:22: The attacker re-compiled and re-installed
the trojan code. The attacker was probably not satisfied with
the version they deployed at the beginning of the day, so they
returned, re-compiled the libselinux library, and then pro-
duced another binary on the spot.
S5: 2016-05-25, 22:08: The attacker created a hidden directory
‘/var/tmp/...‘, where they compiled some suspicious tools,
e.g., pcap or nmap, and installed them into the system. Fol-
lowing that, they started a network scan and used the directory
to store results obtained for individual network targets. Since
then, the data was kept being captured and logged into this
directory. The directory is used for a massive scan spanning
almost two days, which is visible from the relevant histogram,
see Figure 5.
S6: 2016-05-26, 23:12: The system files with user account and
passwords (/etc/shadow and /etc/passwd) were modified
Figure 5: Indication of a continuous creation of files generated by the network scanner.
one day later. It is uncertain whether this activity is related to
the incident or not.
7.3 Apparatus
The server part of the FIMETIS application was deployed on a
common cloud machine, equipped with 8GB RAM, 80GB disk space
and 4 CPUs. We conducted the evaluation online using Google Meet.
The participants used Google Chrome on their computers or laptops
with resolutions ranging from FullHD to UHD. Their interaction
and comments were recorded for later analysis.
7.4 Procedure
The user study was divided into four parts. First, the participants
were introduced to the general procedure, signed a consent form,
and filled the demography questionnaire. Then, the experimenters
presented the tool, explained all its features using the first dataset,
and let the participant familiarize with the tool for 5–10 minutes.
Next, the participants were to find the following signs of the file
system manipulation and usage:
T1: Files or directories with suspicious names.
T2: System files (configurations or executables) possibly modified
by the attacker.
T3: Executables or libraries that were not installed from its package
(i.e., either directly downloaded or manually compiled on the
system).
T4: Privileged executables (with root s-bit) possibly used in the
attack.
T5: Suspicious or unusual commands possibly executed by the
attacker.
T6: Possibly compromised user accounts.
These tasks address requirements R1–R5. Together, they should
provide an overview of what happened during the incident. While
the tasks T1,T2,T4, and T6 reflect different aspects of the detection
of file system anomalies (R3), T5 and T3 are related to the execution
of suspicious commands (R4) and traces of batch processing (R5)
respectively. All the tasks require iterative exploration of the file
system structure (R1) and temporal relationships (R2).
The participants had the tasks printed out so that they could easily
make notes. The experimenter asked the participants to solve the
tasks iteratively in any order. They were asked to think aloud. At
the end of this evaluation phase, they had to summarize the incident
upon their observations.
Although the real investigation of an incident lasts many hours
or can even spread to several days, we restricted the participants to
roughly one hour. The study’s goal was not to get all the details
about the attack, which is usually not possible without additional
pieces of information such as system logs or network traffic, but to
ascertain whether the analyst can get a quick insight into the incident
using our tool.
When the incident investigation ended, the participant filled the
usability questionnaire (Simple Ease Question, SEQ [23]), and Sys-
tem Usability Scale, SUS [22]. Finally, the experimenter interviewed
participants on their final thoughts and feature requests.
7.5 Limitations
This user study has several limitations. The number of participants
is relatively low. The reason lies in the time demands put on the
evaluation process, which took roughly two hours per participant.
To minimize the impact of this limitation, we involved security prac-
titioners – possible users of the tool. On the other hand, we aimed
to cover a wide range of expertise. Therefore, we engaged both
highly skilled experts who have practical experience with collecting
evidence from file systems and professionals who lack these specific
skills as they focus on other cybersecurity domain, e.g., network
analysis or cybersecurity research.
We are also aware that the evaluation was performed with only one
test case, and then the results could be affected by the specific attack
vector hidden in the dataset. We strove for authenticity, and then we
preferred a real incident from artificial data. On the other hand, we
aimed to choose an incident which is typical in a sense. The selected
dataset contains the digital evidence of common attack steps like the
abuse of user accounts, privilege escalation, installation of backdoor,
and using the compromised host for further illegal activities.
7.6 Results
Usability & learnability: User experience with the tool was evalu-
ated by the System Usability Scale (SUS). SUS is a de facto standard
method for assessing systems’ usability regardless of their purpose.
The average SUS score of FIMETIS was 88.5. According to the
adjective ratings [2], the score corresponds to excellent ratings and
proves compliance with R6.
SUS questions #4 (I think that I would need the support of a
technical person to be able to use this product) and #10 (I needed
to learn many things before I could get going with this product) can
also be used to interpret learnability [22]. The average answers 1.2
and 1.8, respectively, on the Likert scale from 1: “strongly agree” to
5: “strongly disagree” suggest that FIMETIS is also easy to learn.
Preferences in using visual-analytic elements: FIMETIS is
designed as a generic tool where hypotheses can be verified in
various ways using the combination of diverse visual-analytical
elements. To explore if some elements are more popular then other,
we analyzed videos captured during the evaluation. We measured
the usage of key interactions and data filtering concepts: filtering
data by attributes, using predefined clusters, filtering data by span
windows, searching and filtering by path, and using push-pins.
The results are summarized in Figure 6. Push-pins represent the
maximal number of bookmarks used by the analyst at the same time
(20 push-pins in the participant P5). The other axes encode the
relative time the analyst used the element. The time is expressed
as the percentage of the investigation time. It is to be pointed out
that the name filtering is used occasionally for temporal filtering and
navigation during the interaction with the List View. Therefore, its
usage can be underestimated in the radar charts.
The radar charts depicted show that different analysts preferred
different combinations of elements. Usually, only 2–3 elements
are used intensively, while others are ignored either completely or
used significantly less. Another interesting observation, which is not
captured in the radar charts, is that the analysts used only one span
window. P1 did not use this element, and P3 used two span windows
simultaneously, but only for a very short time.
Figure 6: Approximate utilization of visual-analytic elements of GUI by individual participants P1–P5. The push-pins axis encodes maximal
number of bookmarks used simultaneously. Other axes represent the relative time (as the percentage of investigation time) when the element
was used.
Precision of the attack timeline: To evaluate the ability of the
FIMETIS tool to provide a quick insight into the incident timeline,
incident scenarios reported by participants were compared with the
baseline scenario S1–S6. The precision was ranked by the authors
of the paper. The results are summarized in table 2.
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
Table 2: Precision of the attack reconstruction: overlooked/not
identified, identified partially, identified correctly.
S1 (compromising the account ’martin’) was identified by all
participants. However, P3 and P5 identified the account together
with ’roberto’. They did not decide who was the primary target of
the attacker.
S2 (installation of a trojan code) was identified by all participants,
but the level of observed details varied. All the participants discov-
ered the /var/lib/.s as part of the attack vector, but P1, P3, and
P5 did not provide more details about this attack phase. Moreover,
the selinux library was completely overlooked by them. P2 did
not mention the restart of the SSH server, but SSH was correctly
identified as the service used for the escalation of privileges. P4
noticed and described all the details related to this attack phase,
including the usage of /etc/ld.so.preload.
S3 (suspicious manipulation with the account ’roberto’) was iden-
tified by all participants and considered part of the attack. Neither
participant found the real abuse of this account. However, P3 and
P5 did not decide whether the ’roberto’ or ’martin’ was the primary
access point for the attacker.
S4 (re-compilation and new installation of the trojan code) was
overlooked by all participants except P4. This analyst noticed the
re-installation but overlooked the re-compilation of the trojan code
at the compromised computer.
S5 (a hidden directory) was identified by all participants very
quickly. The directory contained almost 12.000 records combining
source code of multiple tools, traces of their compilation and usage,
and data files gathered by the attacker. Nevertheless, the analysts
were able to spot tools and data relevant to the attack vector and
directly describe their purpose in the attack (P2, P3, P4, P5) or at
least mention them as a tool worth further exploration (P1).
S6 (modification of the user account database) was identified by
all participants. P1 noticed the changes but finally considered as not
being linked to the incident. P2 did not provide more details. Other
analysts considered the changes to be part of the attack when the
attacker probably created a new user for later access.
Tasks difficulty: To evaluate the usability of the tool for solving
individual tasks T1–T6, we analyzed the SEQ answers. We used
this method because our tasks were too complex for metrics such
as task duration time or completion rate, and the method performs
as good as more complicated measures of task difficulty [23]. The
participants responded to a single question associated with individual
tasks (“Overall, how difficult or easy did you find this task?”), using
a scale from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult). The box plot is
depicted in Figure 7.
Overall, the participants considered tasks rather easy with the
FIMETIS tool. This result correlates with the analysts’ success to
correctly reconstruct the incident in limited time at an appropriate
level of detail. The only exception was finding out executables or
1 2 3 4 5
T6
T5
T4
T3
T2
T1
Figure 7: Distribution of answers to SEQ tasks (min/max values,
lower/upper quartile, and average). Lower score is better (1 = Very
easy, 5 = Very difficult).
libraries that were not installed from its package (T3). This task is
considered rather difficult. However, this result also corresponds to
the low success rate of revealing the re-compilation of a trojan code
(step S4 of the incident). The reason probably lies in the complexity
of the task, which forces the analyst to iteratively combine multiple
views and combine multiple features of the tool.
8 Discussion and Future Work
The work we presented in this paper focuses on the design and
user evaluation of a visual-analytics tool that aims to support effi-
cient disk snapshot exploration as part of the cybersecurity incident
investigation workflow.
We collaborated with three skilled investigators on the clarifica-
tion of forensic processes and the specification of requirements. The
evaluation conducted with five cybersecurity experts revealed that
the analytical tool built upon these requirements is intuitive and easy
to use. All of the analysts were able to provide an incident report
at surprising precision in very limited time. Moreover, it seems that
the results obtained from less and more skilled analysts are subtle.
We are aware that it could be affected by the attack vector of the
incident selected for the evaluation, but this unexpected finding is
promising for further development.
Another interesting observation was made regarding the usage
of proposed visual-analytics concepts and their combinations. We
noticed different workflows in using the tool by different analysts.
This finding indicates that the tool is sufficiently generic. It supports
various approaches to the verification of hypotheses and collecting
the evidence. Moreover, the results captured in Figure 6 suggest that
there could exist a favorite combination of analytical elements. For
example, the analysts P2 and P5 used predominantly span windows
with name filtering and a lot of push-pins, while P3 and P4 preferred
span windows and clusters combined with only a few push-pins.
Exploring such behavioral patterns would bring insight into analyt-
ical strategies. However, it requires a much deeper evaluation and
analysis in future work.
Our work is still in progress. During the user study, we collected
user feedback and requests for additional useful features.
File system attributes management: Multiple analysts forgot to
cancel the per-attribute filtering during the investigation. This mis-
take led to false hypotheses and delay in the investigation. Empha-
sizing this filter or indicating that the List View contains only entries
with selected modifications are required.
Dealing with file system records: The List View is the primary
source of information for investigators, and efficient manipulation
with records has shown to be the key factor for the investigation pro-
cess. In spite of searching, filtering, and smart navigation techniques
implemented in the List View, the analysts requested even more fea-
tures for rapid navigation in the list. Especially, scrolling the list to a
record by CTRL+F hotkey was missing. Currently, only highlighting
and filtering out the data by the typed text is implemented in the
tool. Also, the support of regular expressions and hiding records
matching the typed text temporarily were required. Complementary
hierarchical views to the strictly temporal ordering of records, e.g.,
using treemaps to convey space requirements of file system parts,
reveal anomalies, and navigate to them quickly, will be considered
in the future work.
The current implementation of FIMETIS serves as an analytical
and decision-making tool for file system metadata analysis (Figure 2).
Although the evaluation proved the usefulness of the tool, users ask
for the support of other parts of the investigation process as well.
Reaching this goal requires making significant extensions to current
functionality and then to the design. In what follows, we outline key
requirements and their possible impact on visualizations and GUIs.
Incident report creation: Incident reports are key outputs of the
investigation process. As a lot of clues and pieces of the incident ev-
idence appear during the interaction, it would be useful to use them
for the report creation. Apart from online notes that have already
been integrated into the new version of FIMETIS, investigators’
feedback revealed possible changes in using bookmarks for this pur-
pose. Currently, bookmarks are very simple. They are represented as
push-pins referring to interesting records (points in time) and used
for fast navigation (jumping to these records). Multiple analysts
were asking for the possibility to distinguish between push-pins by
color, tagging them, and making their own notes. Once the concept
of bookmarks is moved from push-pins to advanced annotations, it
would be possible to use them for the direct generation of incident
reports or their parts.
Analysis of system logs: File system metadata represents only
one source of information for investigators. Other data sources, like
system logs or network traffic data, are often available to provide
a broader context. Especially so-called super-timelines, i.e., file
system metadata merged with system logs, are often used for forensic
investigation. Extending FIMETIS with system logs should be
possible. Both types of data sources are time series. The proposed
approaches to file system exploration seem to be reusable also for
system logs. However, further research and evaluation are needed.
It is especially necessary to balance between unified exploration,
when an analyst uses both data types together, and distinguishing
both contexts as they represent different knowledge with possibly
different uncertainty.
Other information sources: Ability to analyze other data sources
like network traffic or memory snapshots are required by forensic
investigators as well. However, they encode very different data with
very different abstractions that require the application of specific
visual-analysis techniques and concepts. Therefore, narrowly fo-
cused tools are designed that provide comprehensive visual-analytics
interfaces [6]. Joining these information sources into a single ”silver
bullet” analytical tool can be counter-productive and going against
the R6 requirement.
We aim to address the aforementioned features and enhancements
in future work. As the FIMETIS application is already used in
practice for the investigation of real-world incidents (three incidents
were successfully investigated by the security teams of Masaryk
University and CESNET so far), we aim to utilize this experience
to extend the functionality of the application further. Especially, we
plan to introduce advanced user-defined clusters and the support of
multiple timelines, e.g., records of system logs. These extensions
will require changes in the current design and the development of
new visual-analytic methods to cope with even bigger and more
variable data.
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